

## PROFESSOR EVERETT AS A METAPHYSICIAN.

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THE principal document for any study of Professor Charles Carroll Everett's metaphysical views is the "Science of Thought." We have all to regret that it remains almost the only document. Professor Everett, although no very voluminous writer, published several books, and a considerable number of essays. But amongst these publications there is no one, except the "Science of Thought," which contains any extended account of his own philosophical position. Yet philosophy, although always secondary in our teacher's mind and in his studies to religion, remained, to the very end, one of his principal interests. He followed its current literature with care, and did not wholly neglect even the discussions of recent psychology, although these of course lay much further from his own province than did those of the metaphysicians. As a student of the history of thought, he contributed to the interpretation of Hindoo philosophy. His volume upon

Fichte, moreover, is entirely devoted to a philosophical theme, although, unfortunately for us, this theme is treated in the work in question altogether from an expository point of view. In the occasional essays that were but too rare during his earlier academic years, but that came to be more frequent during the last decade of his life, he had many opportunities to speak as a philosopher and as a student of the history of philosophy; and he used these opportunities, in single passages of these essays, with expert skill.<sup>1</sup> But his characteristic reserve limited all these expressions. As one follows these papers, just where the reader most hopes to find the author speaking in his own person upon some of the philosophical issues raised, he contents himself with hints, or modestly points out the bounds within which the plan of his essay confines him. His lecture-notes, prepared for his courses in Theology, are, so far as I have seen the manuscript, extremely brief. I have had the use of an excellent series of notes taken in his lecture-room by Mr. V. J. Emery; but these notes also, interesting as they are, add much less than one could wish to the discussions of the "Science of Thought." But surely no colleague of Professor Everett who ever had occasion to discuss with him a philosophical problem, and no student who listened to the way in which he treated the metaphysical questions of the Philosophy of Religion, or who followed the Seminary that in 1898-99 he devoted to a study of Fichte, could fail to believe that much light would have resulted had he left us his definitive expression upon all of the central problems of metaphysics. In his closing years he was keenly awake to the importance of the issues that have recently become again prominent in the discussions regarding philosophical Idealism. The relations of Idealism to the problems of Freedom, of Individualism, and of Immortality, and to the question as to the relations of Thought and Will in the universe—these were topics upon which, as a student of philosophy, he was always seeking new light. The clearness and serenity of his religious faith regarding certain aspects of just these matters, in no wise hindered his curiosity regarding their philosophical fortunes, and in no way predetermined him to any

<sup>1</sup> In particular I here refer to the papers: "The Relation of Modern Philosophy to Liberalism" (in the *Institute Essays*, Boston, 1880); "The Ultimate Facts of Ethics" and "The New Ethics" (in *Poetry, Comedy and Duty*); "Kant's Influence in Theology" (in the *NEW WORLD*, vol. vi. p. 69); "Reason in Religion" (*Id.* vol. vi. p. 638). This list of Professor Everett's philosophical contributions could be of course considerably extended.

dogmatism as to how they should be made topics of rational inquiry. On the other hand, while he kept such issues, in all their theoretical aspects, open, and never shunned the discussion of opposing points of view, he had certainly reached, towards the end of his career, a more mature and many-sided philosophy than his volume of 1869 was able to express. The Revised Edition of the "Science of Thought," issued in 1890, differs, after all, but slightly from the original work. The closing period of Professor Everett's philosophical development remains, accordingly, without any adequate expression.

The "Science of Thought" itself was published when the author was forty years of age. It represents the result of studies that were begun at the University of Berlin, under Hegel's successor, Gabler, a well-known and prominent member of the Right Wing of the Hegelian school, whom Professor Everett heard in the years 1851 and 1852. These studies had carried the author to the works of Hegel himself, and thence not only to a doctrine regarding the first principles of philosophy, but also to a review of the problems regarding the relations of thought and language, as the literature of Comparative Philology at that time defined these problems, and, in addition, to a considerable study of the problems of Inductive Logic. The resulting treatise appears more Hegelian by reason of its external form, than it actually is in its contents. The Categories, or fundamental conceptions, enumerated and discussed in the First Book of the "Science of Thought," are indeed confessedly derived from Hegel's "Logic." The treatment of the syllogism in the Second Book is founded upon Hegel's classification of the three Syllogistic Figures. The Hegelian insistence upon the organic unity of form and matter, and upon the uselessness of a merely formal logic, is everywhere prominent. Yet the illustrations and applications of the logical doctrine of Hegel, so far as that doctrine is followed at all, are carried out with great freedom of expression. And the fundamental philosophical conceptions of the whole book are distinctly not Hegelian conceptions. They are the conceptions which remained to the end characteristic of Professor Everett's work as a theologian,—the conceptions emphasized in 1897 in the essay on "Reason in Religion," and repeatedly illustrated in his printed papers, in his sermons and in his class-room lectures. Students familiar with Professor Everett's personality will hardly need to have these fundamental conceptions stated in any words except his own. But it is of considerable interest to review the way in

which these ideas were combined in Professor Everett's development of his philosophical doctrines.

With what presuppositions shall philosophy begin? Or shall philosophy use any presuppositions at all? Whence do we derive our initial assurances regarding the universe? Are these assurances obtained from sense, or from innate ideas? Are they indubitable assurances? Are they mere postulates, whose ultimate value is practical? Do they give us any means of knowing things as they are in themselves? Or are we limited to phenomena? Is Hume right in confining our knowledge to the world of impressions? Is Kant right in cutting us off from insight into the things in themselves, while making the forms of thought supreme as the determiners of our whole realm of phenomena? Is Hegel right in giving thought access to absolute truth? Is Schleiermacher justified in founding religious faith rather upon feeling than upon thought?—To all these questions, Professor Everett suggests answers in terms of a fundamental principle of his whole philosophy.<sup>1</sup> “If,” he says, “giving up all theory, and omitting nothing from our data because we do not understand it, we take the facts of our consciousness just as they are, we shall be able to simplify this whole thing [viz. the problem of our rational knowledge]. The truth of the matter appears to be that we come into the world with certain instincts of activity, bodily and mental, and a faith by which we follow these instincts, confident that they will not deceive or mislead us. As, however, the word ‘faith’ may seem to imply too much a conscious foundation, we will use the term, ‘good faith.’ Man comes into the world in good faith. By this is meant that he comes without any feeling that he is to be imposed upon or trifled with. He takes it for granted, even without being conscious of it, that life is a real and earnest thing. In other words, he begins to live in good earnest.” . . . “This seriousness, earnestness, honesty, or good faith, whatever term we may apply to it, in which even the infant, in which even the brute, begins life, is the basis of the conscious faith in induction. It is the parent of the grand truth of the reason that the world is a systematic whole.” . . . “The individual, meaning honestly and seriously himself, believes the world to be honest and serious. And if this be so, it [viz. the world] must have some meaning, some bond, some unity.” . . . “We thus come to the propositions of the reason.” These “propositions of the reason,” to which Professor Everett here refers, are

<sup>1</sup> *Science of Thought*, p. 122.

the abstract formulation of that fundamental instinct out of which, as we have here begun to see, all our insight, according to his view, develops. The propositions, however, are not innate verities. "The consciousness of the truths called innate," says Professor Everett (p. 122), "is developed out of the processes of mind which are said to rest on them, instead of being the conscious starting-point of these processes. I do not have faith in the stability and unity of the universe because I believe the proposition that the universe is a perfect and systematic whole. On the contrary, I deduce this proposition from the faith with which I expect in every case this stability. Still further, I do not believe from induction in this stability; for my faith in induction is itself based upon this other faith."

The term "Reason" is thus used, in Professor Everett's account, to cover all the conscious processes through which the original "good faith," or "seriousness," or instinct of reasonableness becomes articulate in our minds so as to give us a doctrine about the world in its wholeness. The "propositions of the reason" are therefore, all of them, fundamental assertions about the unity of things. We reach them in trying to formulate our original "good faith." The only test that we have correctly formulated such "propositions of the reason" is the fact that when we reflect upon our formulas, we observe that we could not surrender them without being false to the original instinct which has given to our whole life its seriousness and its meaning. There is (p. 139) a "conception of the universe, as a complete and systematic whole," which "is involved in the simple good faith in which man begins his life." Our original trust implies "the reality of the outward world" (p. 139), and the "organic unity of things." By this trust "man is fitted to be a part of this great organism in which he finds himself." But in developing this original confidence into the special "propositions of the reason" we are constantly guided by hints which our experience furnishes. The propositions themselves form in consequence no rigidly limited collection of axioms. Their multiplicity is due simply to the effort to express the one instinct in terms of the variety of the facts of life. New efforts at formulation are therefore always in order so long as we remain imperfect beings.

In particular, however, the "propositions of the reason," when once they have come to be formulated, fall into three groups. The first group comprises the propositions in regard to Truth. These indeed seem, at first sight, to comprise all the propositions

that come to consciousness as we learn to formulate our instinctive good faith. For (p. 138) "Faith in our instinct of generalization is faith in the truth of things, in their reality and in their mutual connection." . . . "When we say that a thing is not real or true, we mean that it has no connection with what is about it, with what has gone before it, or with what comes after it. What we mean by the being of anything is this interpenetration of relations which makes it a force and an object in the world." The propositions regarding truth concern, in consequence, all the principal conceptions of pure metaphysics, such as the conceptions of identity and difference, of part and whole, of cause and effect. Each of these more special conceptions comes to light when we develop some aspect of our original trust in the unity of things. Thus, in order to conceive any sequence of events as forming a systematic whole, we have to conceive its successive stages as linked through the connection of cause and effect. Or again, when we conceive of various objects as nevertheless in some sense identical, as we do whenever we classify objects or whenever we form general conceptions, we merely apply our general faith in organic unity to the case of any one class of objects by conceiving various individuals as having part in the same organic whole; namely, in the class or universe to which they belong.<sup>1</sup> "What is identical in bodies of similar nature is their place in the great organism." . . . "So the function of each member of a class of bodies, so far as filling out the one grand organism is concerned, is identical with that of every other member of the same class, however much the relation of this individual member to the organic completion of its own class may be different from that of any other." In other words, the members of a class of objects have a common or universal nature in so far as the class itself forms one organic whole. These, then, are instances of the propositions of the reason when the reason is applied to various objects. I repeat, the number of such propositions of the reason appears, according to our author, to admit of no precise determination. He attempts no complete statement of their system. He does not accept Hegel's attempt to systematize them as at all adequate.

But these propositions regarding truth, universal as is their scope, do not, after all, exhaust the work of the reason. For our original instinctive trust in the unity of the world does not merely guide our generalizations about the being of things, but also determines our judgment as to the goodness of deeds. Here, to be sure,

<sup>1</sup> *Science of Thought*, pp. 140-142.

another aspect of our primal "good faith" comes to light. Professor Everett, as we may now recall, described to us that "good faith" in its original form, not only as an instinctive belief, but also as a practical activity. The individual is "honest" and "serious," and he takes his world to be honest and serious also. "He takes it for granted, even without being conscious of it, that life is a real and earnest thing. He begins to live in good earnest. The infant has an instinct to suck. It knows nothing of the provision nature has made for its support. It simply sucks, in good faith, anything that comes within the reach and compass of its mouth" (p. 123). When such instincts, viewed upon their active side, reach the grade of our own rational consciousness, after a long training in which they have been disciplined into systems of conduct, they are accompanied by a consciousness that we not only can act, but also can choose our own acts by virtue of our free decision as between conflicting instinctive tendencies. And so we now judge our acts with reference to their bearing upon our place within the organic whole to which we belong. Sympathy, to which our author assigns (p. 144) an importance similar to that which Schopenhauer gave to it, furnishes to us the knowledge that the life of our fellows is kindred with our own, and that we inevitably act with and for all our fellows. Hence our organic union with the world demands humanity in our conduct. A still more profound sympathy consciously links our destiny to that of the entire universe, with which we have, from the first, instinctively felt our kinship. Inanimate nature shows us, indeed, no objects that we can serve as we do our fellows; but "the nature [in us] which fails to find its conscious kindred in the separate objects of the world finds it in the Power which is within and behind all; and, itself a spirit, feels itself in relation and contact with the Infinite Spirit in whose life it lives" (p. 146). And just as the first serious act, for instance, the act of the sucking infant, is an unconscious effort to verify in an active way our unity with the universe, just so the developed moral life necessarily has, as its rules, certain "propositions of the reason" whereby we define what acts and attitudes of will are good because they lead us to active harmony with God and with man, and what volitions are evil because they tend to wound the integrity of our own and of the common life. But neither the contents nor the consciousness of the morally good can be explained by attributing the moral law to the arbitrary decree of God, or to the selfish interest of men, or to the finished structure of an innate conscience. Innate in us

all is merely the instinct to realize the world's unity, in its relation to our own life, through deeds that shall express our kinship with the universe. All the special contents of morality are brought to our consciousness through our experience. The obligation which we recognize as binding us, not merely to feel the unity of things, but actively to realize the good, is due to the fact that except through moral action we cannot win the conscious harmony with the world which the deepest instincts of our nature originally and always demand. That this harmony, as a moral harmony, must be won through freedom of choice in willing, — this is due to the very nature of action as distinct from contemplation; and hereby the propositions regarding the good come to be assertions not merely about what is, but about what ought to be.

To contemplation, however, we return, when we speak of the third type of the propositions of the reason; namely, those which refer to Beauty. "Man is so much a part of the universe that he cannot help rejoicing in all its varied perfections. As he rejoices in seeing human nature reach its ideal, that is, to see the idea of human nature perfectly manifested, so also he rejoices at every realization of every true ideal." . . . "There is a . . . freedom in every triumph of the controlling idea throughout nature. This free idealization of the real, or this free realization of the ideal, we call Beauty. As truth represents to us the abstract existence of things, and as goodness represents to us the struggle of the spiritual world to become what it should, or its voluntary assumption of its true nature, so beauty gives us this true nature with no mark of struggle or of separation. We rejoice only in this complete perfection."<sup>1</sup>

The sense of the beautiful consists "in a sense of companionship in the outer world, and a sympathetic enjoyment of its perfection" (p. 154). Most complete becomes this sense when it assumes a consciously religious form, seeing in the beautiful object the expression of the Absolute Life. Religion itself, as Professor Everett defined it at the beginning of his lectures on Theology, "is a feeling toward a spiritual presence manifested in truth, goodness and beauty."<sup>2</sup> Hence religion is not complete without the recognition of the beautiful; just as the æsthetic sense reaches its highest form in a recognition of the perfection of the beautiful object as the manifestation of the divine perfection. "If the various products of human art together make up the completeness of

<sup>1</sup> *Science of Thought*, pp. 152, 153.

<sup>2</sup> From the lecture notes of Mr. V. J. Emery.



artistic beauty, what must be the beauty of that great whole which includes the universe! This, we must believe, is the outgrowth of one vast idea, one perfect ideal. Observation, science, intuition, reveal to us more and more of this completeness. It involves the relations of worlds, of life and of histories. This grand idea, which seems to us to be infinite, revealing itself in the structure and progress of the whole of creation, is the perfect beauty of which what we discern is but a minute part.”<sup>1</sup>

Common to the three types of “propositions of the reason,” as they are thus set forth, is their insistence upon the unity of the world, upon the kinship of the world and ourselves, and upon the significance which this kinship imparts to our own existence. They are, therefore, all of them, as much propositions about our own life as they are propositions about the universe. Yet, on the other hand, they would have no value for our life unless they were propositions about the universe. For us they indeed have their origin in our instincts. But in themselves they have far more than a personal or subjective significance. They are true or they are nothing. Professor Everett, therefore, never seriously entertains a Kantian view as to the limited application of the propositions regarding truth. He cannot view these propositions in Kant’s fashion as merely the formulation of our own rational control over the limited realm of human experience. Truth must be objective in order to be truth at all. Reason, in all its three functions alike, consciously concerns itself with the Absolute, with the Universe as a whole and not with mere phenomena. Still less, therefore, can our author share Hume’s skeptical empiricism. The Reason is concerned with the whole, and not merely with our impressions. Sense awakens it in us, experience illustrates it, but unity with God and with all being is its first and last concern. In so far Professor Everett is distinctly an Absolutist, an interpreter of objective truth about God and the world.

Yet the philosopher is not merely a confessor of his faith, but a critic of his own presuppositions and methods. And so, what has Professor Everett to say, as philosopher, regarding not merely the contents but the justification of Reason? What is the ultimate warrant for these three kinds of propositions? For us their source, as we have seen, lies in instinct. But what is their ground? Here one approaches what is most peculiar about our teacher’s philosophical position. As a student of Hegel, he was not only familiar with the author’s famous dialectical method of expounding the

<sup>1</sup> *Science of Thought*, p. 163.

rationality of first principles, but was also fond of this method and was disposed to apply it himself in manifold fashion. This tendency in regard to philosophical method remained with Professor Everett to the end. As a dialectician, he, indeed, had little of the peculiarly merciless ingenuity, or of the technical detail of the German master. Professor Everett's use of the dialectic method was always under the control of his gentle and graceful æsthetic sense. The essays in the volume entitled "Poetry, Comedy and Duty" are full of examples of a certain concrete application of this dialectical method, — an application wherein the abstractions of Hegel's language wholly vanish, while there remains a beautifully playful delight in the contrasts, and in the instability of our imperfect human thought about life, and in the paradoxes of our present existence. This delight our author expresses by means of ideas and theses whose form and order are often determined by the very method which the Platonic Socrates and the modern master of the dialectic art have so perfected. In the "Science of Thought" there is a considerable space devoted to the more technical treatment of the value and place of the dialectical method. Now Hegel himself used this method not merely to analyze, but to justify, in what was intended to be a thorough-going and final way, the ideas of the Reason. For philosophy, according to Hegel, was to furnish a purely theoretical justification of the claims of our thought. But it is just here that Professor Everett parts company with Hegel. Our author assigns, indeed, a very important place to philosophical criticism, to the rational proving of our formulas, and to what he calls Hegel's method of antinomies. But he does not assign to the dialectical criticism, or to the theoretical constructions of the Hegelian system, or of any possible system of philosophy, the sort or the grade of positive significance which Hegel himself, or which some other constructive theoretical Idealist, might attribute to this or to that particular method of building up a metaphysical doctrine.

Philosophy, according to Professor Everett, is powerful to relieve us from error through its criticisms of imperfect formulas; but we must look solely to the primal "good faith," carefully developed, indeed, through criticism, but never superseded, to guide us towards all accessible positive truth. With instinct we begin. We never transcend our instinctive trust in the seriousness of our life and in the divine unity of our world. Philosophy never reaches, because it never can reach, a deeper ground of assurance than our instinct itself furnishes. In two directions the

abstract systems of rational philosophy accordingly fail to satisfy. For the first, they never are adequate to the wealth of experience. And secondly, they never can substitute abstract reasoning for our primal faith in reason. In recognizing the first of these two defects of all abstract systems of philosophy, Professor Everett, when he wrote the "Science of Thought," was already strongly influenced by a tendency towards a thoughtful empiricism. This empiristic tendency plainly grew upon him in his later years. The lecture-notes on Theology show how carefully he sought to take account of the more recent empirical studies regarding evolution. His references to the special sciences, in all his papers, indicate both a serious interest and a permanently receptive mind. Of *a priori* speculation concerning topics of special knowledge, Professor Everett was never fond. And so, constructive philosophy meets one limit in its dependence upon experience and upon special science for all its concrete illustrations of the unity of natural phenomena. But, on the other hand, philosophy, viewed as a criticism of fundamental beliefs, has its limit in the fact that we cannot dig beneath the roots of thought — namely, beneath the instincts of the reason — without paralyzing the very life of thought, which not only springs from these unconscious roots, but depends for its vitality upon theirs. The philosopher, therefore, may and must criticise; and no abstract formula is sacred to him merely because it has come to be expressed. But his criticisms themselves are expressions of his rational instincts, and can possess no validity deeper than the validity of Reason itself.

On the other hand, there is indeed no fixed system of "first and fundamental truths" graven upon the mind of man. All our formulas are efforts to express the sense of our primal instinct of good faith. Hence there is indeed a wide range for the work of a reflective critical philosophy. A principle appears before us, — say the principle of causation, or a thesis about God's nature. Every such principle is an attempt to formulate our primal instinct. As such an attempt, it cannot shine by its own light, as an absolutely certain and undemonstrable axiom. It is open to question. The questioning process best takes the form of the dialectical method. For every formula, being abstract, is one-sided. It refers to the central unity of things; but even in attempting to utter that unity it rends the unity asunder. Now necessity, and now freedom, now the stubborn objectivity of the facts of nature, and now the supremacy of the demands of the heart, — such are the opposed aspects which various formulas may

emphasize. Philosophy brings together the abstractions. The "method of antinomies," which Hegel perfected, makes a business of opposing to every finite formula its complementary and antithetical formula. The very propositions of the reason themselves, in their three fundamental forms, involve us in antinomies so soon as we seek to use them abstractly as bases for deductive reasoning. The whole universe is true, good and beautiful, all at once. But if you view goodness in the abstract, and if you then attempt to reason deductively from the goodness of some particular ideal object to the reality of that finite object, or from the proposition that all is good to the necessary goodness of this event, to the inevitable righteousness of this man or of this deed, or to the certainty that the right cause will win in this war or in this election, — well, if you reason thus, your formula misleads you. Nor can you reason that since a pig is real he must be beautiful, or that since this youth is beautiful he must be good. Goodness, beauty, truth, as soon as you abstract them, and view their relation to one another and to finite things, are no longer in unity, but are in dialectical opposition to one another. It is the business of philosophy to show by its criticism the inevitableness of these conflicts, the rationality of these very antinomies, the road homewards, towards the central unity, in spite of, — yes, by means of, these very oppositions. If instinct first unconsciously views the world as one, our rational growth, even in bringing our instinct to self-consciousness, gives it formulations that are always, in their isolation, inadequate. Philosophy detects the inadequacy by means of its criticisms, and bids us unite again what abstract formulation has sundered. But in uttering this very command, philosophy but attempts afresh the task that instinct sets to us all alike. Philosophy does not discover the primal unity, nor does it supersede instinct by means of demonstration; but it helps us to see where our abstractions have become untrue to our instincts, and where we have lost hold upon unity in our attempts to win sharp outlines. Philosophy in its turn does not aim to destroy the sharp outlines, but to let the light of unity shine anew over all the complications of the world of the understanding.

Hegel spoke, in the introduction to his "Phänomenologie," of philosophy as constructing a ladder whereby common sense could ascend with assurance to the realm of *Absolutes Wissen*, — of rational assurance. In Professor Everett's teaching it is not so much philosophy, as the natural evolution of our instinctive faith to which the construction of this ladder is due. Philosophy can

only use what instinct creates. But the thoughts of men, the formulas and criticisms of the philosophers, are more like angels, ascending and descending this ladder. No mere thought is, or creates, or exhausts, or carries with it, the whole truth, or provides from its own resources the way to reach the goal. But our thoughts, moving upon the support that our instinctive good faith in the universe upholds, descend from heaven when they attempt to explain the facts of our world as results of the divine unity, and ascend heavenwards when, observing the fragmentariness of even our clearest theories of things, they turn from their own labors towards the divine source whence they sprang, and carry back their own oppositions to the unity wherein are all things.

But still one may persist: If instinctive faith is all that we have, is not all our insight doubtful? Is absolute truth in any sense really accessible to us? Professor Everett replies in the "Science of Thought," as he repeatedly replied later, that rational skepticism is impossible except upon the basis of an instinctive confidence in the logical value of a skeptical process of thought. "Faith in thought is simply this confidence that it [viz. thought] is essentially one with the objects of thought. It is impossible to prove it [i. e. to prove a warrant for this faith], for proof would be an appeal to thought, and would thus assume the faith to be proved. It is as impossible to disprove it, for confidence in the negative argument would involve confidence in thought. . . . To doubt the reliability of thought, at the demand of thought, would imply more faith in it than to *believe* anything else at its bidding."<sup>1</sup> With this indirect method, not of proving the validity of thought, but of recognizing the eye whereby Reason sees all things, Professor Everett requires philosophy to be satisfied.

The questions with which we began our discussion of our author's philosophy have now been answered. The theses most characteristic of his philosophy are these: (1) That we indeed have access to absolute truth, but primarily by means of instinctive faith; (2) That our experience is needed to give this faith its special contents, to teach us what things are true, good, beautiful, but that this our experience itself still gets its whole significance from the ideas of the reason; (3) That thought is indeed needed to formulate these ideas of the reason, but that no finite formulation can ever express them quite adequately; (4) That thought is also needed to develop dialectically the inevitable

<sup>1</sup> *Science of Thought*, p. 205.

antinomies incident to all our finite formulations of the ideas of the reason, but that these antinomies are significant mainly by virtue of the fact that they point us back from the realms of abstraction, of diversity and of contrast to the unity of the Absolute; (5) That these ideas of the reason have their sole warrant in the very faith with which we instinctively begin; and finally (6) That this faith survives all criticism and all antinomies, and rationally confounds all skepticism, just because all doubt gets its warrant through a thinking process, and can mean something definite to us only in so far as we have a confidence in the thinking process itself, and accordingly in the rational unity upon which all thinking rests.

Such is, in outline, Professor Everett's fundamental philosophy. In his lectures on Theology it determines his whole procedure. Doctrines come to his attention, — doctrines about time and eternity, about creation, about freedom and necessity, about mechanism and teleology. The history of religion and of philosophy, and the experience of life, suggest these doctrines. He compares and criticises them. He decides between the conflicting views expounded, if he decides at all, hesitantly, so far as special formulas are concerned. He is keenly sensitive to difficulties, modest as to solutions. Yet the effect is never skeptical or disheartening; because the difficulties are difficulties about how we are to express a truth whose inmost essence is instinctively known to us all alike. A theological obscurity for Professor Everett thus seems like a lover's difficulty in trying to express how it is that he loves, and what his love means. The more troublesome the problem of expression, the securer becomes the consciousness of the love. Antinomies abound; but they constitute, when taken together, a partial manifestation of the central unity. Thus the student is led to philosophize, but in order to quicken his religious sense. He balances opinions, but even as he observes the scales wavering, he comes to feel that, after all, the whole combined weight of these various views is sustained by the foundations upon which every faith rests, and upon which the very scales of reason also are supported. He cares, therefore, less for abstract decisions than for sympathetic appreciations. The unity of the spirit gains more from such a study than does the power to refute heresies.

So far, however, as special formulations appear in these lectures, and in the closing essays of Professor Everett's career, their modest expression still lets us catch glimpses of a body of doctrine

concerning whose details we can only wish to know more. An Idealism Professor Everett's philosophy certainly was. As to the problem of the One and the Many, he inclined rather, as we have seen, to emphasizing unity as against any abstract pluralism. On the other hand, he fully recognized that a truly significant unity must do justice both to finite individuality and to finite freedom of choice, while in their turn these latter must be defined with no abstract insistence upon their separateness as existent facts. They must be harmonized with the divine unity without losing their reality. To the concept of creation Professor Everett appears to have attached a decidedly positive sense, although he interpreted it as being, on the whole, an eternal creation. A special region of the created world, such as our planet, had its beginning. But the created universe as a whole seems to have appeared to him, so far as I can judge from the lecture-notes, eternal with God. Nature itself, meanwhile, has for him decidedly more than the Berkeleyan type of reality. The "abstract objectivity" of physical facts must be recognized as having a genuine place in the system of things, although always subject to the unity of the whole. If, in such theses, our teacher seems to have emphasized pluralistic aspects of his doctrine, his views as to time, and as to the knowability of the Absolute, were developed, in the lectures on Theology, with an express emphasis upon unity. The world is, above all, Spirit. And Spirit we know best, through the intuitive Reason, as Absolute Spirit. It is our own finite nature, it is our separation from the unity, that is always to us non-transparent and puzzling, the principle that begets antinomies. Hence, in a sense, the Absolute is to us more knowable than we ourselves are. As to Time, for the Absolute, as the mystic view declared, time is apprehended at once, and past and future are to God no real limit of his life or of his knowledge. Evil, again, must be in such wise real as to be harmonized organically with the perfect whole. Yet in the finite world, especially in the world of freedom, Good and Evil are and ought to be in a genuine and by no means insignificant antithesis. As to the special philosophy of Nature, the doctrine of Evolution is to be accepted, but interpreted teleologically; and the organic is never deducible from the purely inorganic.

Such are a few of the special theses which it seems fair to attribute to Professor Everett's later formulation of his philosophical theology. His tentative expressions with regard to them all will now not seem to us skeptical. His constant appeal

to faith will not now seem to us to be any sacrifice of what he viewed as the true office and dignity of philosophy. We can at all events see, in a measure, how he remained perfectly true to his religious interests and assurances while always leaving open a vast realm for free philosophical inquiry.

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