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Review

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for the formation of a system. From such an impulse a colorless, lifeless eclecticism might indeed have proceeded, but never the system of Kant.

E. ADICKES.

Appearance and Reality. A Metaphysical Essay. By F. H. BRADLEY, LL.D., Glasgow, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillan & Co. 1893. [Library of Philosophy. Edited by J. H. Muirhead, M.A.] pp. xxiv, 558.

For the most part, in this brief notice of an important and long-awaited metaphysical essay, one must undertake the business of a very inadequate report, reserving until other opportunities the more fascinating task of criticism. The volume before us is divided into two books: Book I, "Appearance"; Book II, "Reality." By metaphysics one understands "an attempt to know reality as against experience, or again, the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole," (p. 1). In the first book various aspects of the world as it appears are taken up and disposed of so far as a negative criticism is needed to show their self-contradictions and their consequent inadequacy to express the real nature of reality. In the second book a more positive and constructive undertaking is set forth. The general result, as repeatedly stated, is that: "There is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience. In this one whole all appearances come together, and in coming together they in various degrees lose their distinctive natures. The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of existence and content, and, on the other side, appearance consists in the discrepancy between these two aspects. And reality in the end belongs to nothing but the single Real. For take anything, no matter what it is, which is less than the Absolute, and the inner discrepancy at once proclaims that what you have taken is appearance. The alleged reality divides itself and falls apart into two jarring factors. . . . As long as the content stands for something other than its own intent and meaning, as long as the existence actually is less or more than what it essentially must imply, so long we are concerned with mere appearance, and not with genuine reality. And we have found in every region that this discrepancy of aspects prevails. . . . The internal being of everything finite depends on that which is beyond it. . . . And this self-contradiction, this unrest and ideality of all things existing, is a clear proof

that, though such things are, their being is but appearance. But, upon the other hand, in the Absolute, no appearance can be lost. Each one contributes and is essential to the unity of the whole. . . . Every element, however subordinate, is preserved in that relative whole in which its character is taken up and submerged. There are main aspects of the universe of which none can be resolved into the rest. . . . These factors, if not equal, are not subordinate the one to the other, and in relation to the Absolute they are all alike essential and necessary" (pp. 455-457).

In order to reach this result, it is necessary, in the first book, to consider the contradictions specifically involved in the conceptions of various well-known regions or aspects of the finite world, so long as these are supposed to represent reality. First, Qualities, primary and secondary, together with the "problem of inherence," are discussed in Chapters I and II. The outcome is that the "relation between the thing and its qualities is unintelligible." Similarly, in Chapter III, the result is that "relations with or without qualities are unintelligible." The inconsistencies of Space and Time occupy Chapter IV. "Motion and Change," "Causation," "Activity," "Things," form successively the topics of Chapters V-VIII. The "inconsistencies" and the "unintelligibility" involved in assuming these categories as representing reality instead of as embodying mere appearance, are here developed, generally in a very brilliant, but often, perhaps, in too concise, a fashion. Reminiscences of the Hegelian *Phänomenologie* and (at least in one or two passages) of the Herbartian negative criticism of the categories in question, are obvious in the text, although Mr. Bradley, for reasons explained in his Preface, has systematically omitted explicit special references to the easily recognizable and acknowledged historical relations of his discussion. Chapters IX and X, on the concept of the Self, are, in their negations, and despite their analogy to other views, more independent of the historical models; and here it is that our author's personal differences with current idealism first come into prominence. "Phenomenalism" and the "Things-in-Themselves" are disposed of very curtly in Chapters XI and XII; and the first book closes with the general "ruin" of the finite world with respect to its pretension to be a real world. The movement of the argument in this first book is alternately captivating (by reason both of its expert skill and of its fascinating relations to previous metaphysical discussion) and exasperating (by reason of its frequently whimsical treatment of opposing views). On the whole, one's fascination

predominates; and one feels that much of this negative criticism represents what is now a permanent possession of modern metaphysic. The least significant chapters seem to be the ones on Self-consciousness, where Mr. Bradley, while well exposing many customary confusions, seems himself decidedly confused.

The second book opens with a general colloquy with absolute scepticism. Much has been lost; but all is not yet lost. One has a "criterion" of reality (p. 136): "Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion." Nor is this criterion vain or empty; for at once, when used properly, it supplies us with real information (pp. 138, 139). We already have on our hands, namely (p. 140), the whole world of appearance. The magnitude of this world the first book has only the more made manifest. "What appears is, and whatever is cannot fall outside the real." Combining this with the former criterion: "We may say that everything, which appears, is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent. The character of the real is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form." Hence, to the self-contradictory appearances of book first, we now have to oppose positive constructive concepts which shall reconcile or tend to reconcile the aspects that there were discordant. Thus the method of the second book is defined. The content of our theory is taken empirically from the world of appearance. The form to be given to this content is furnished by the principle of universal consistency, which is to characterize the Real. The result, as far as one succeeds, is a positive conception of the Absolute. Limited the whole work is, and, in Mr. Bradley's opinion, must needs be, by our human inability to define more than a few of the positive characters of the process whereby the reconciliation of the various and conflicting appearances with the self-consistent Absolute is to be defined. Mr. Bradley, in this portion of his work, is, in fact, extremely conscious of the incompleteness of human insight, although he is convinced not only of the truth, but of the actual, although limited, constructive success of the processes which he is able to undertake for the sake of reaching his positive definition of the Absolute. We have already seen something of this definition.

More specifically, the Absolute is an "individual" (p. 140 sqq.). There could not be a plurality of reals, for reasons that have appeared in the critical studies of the first book. And so the Absolute must be "a system," or "one whole." This whole must have for its matter "experience," *i.e.*, its content must "fall within sentience"

(p. 144), or be "much the same as given and present fact." This does not mean that reality is "object" for a "subject"; but that "reality is indissolubly one with sentience"; and so the Absolute is a "single and all inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord." The nature of this unity cannot be exhaustively expressed by thought. Thought involves the finite sundering from its own Other or object, and so thought too belongs to the world of appearance. "The entire reality will be merely the object thought out, but thought out in such a way that mere thinking is absorbed" (p. 182). The same is in a greater or less degree true of any other finite aspect, such as "error," or "temporal and spatial appearance." Solipsism, too, like other erroneous accounts of the one "experience," will fail by reason of the self-contradictoriness of its own exclusive character (Chap. XXI).

It is plain that Mr. Bradley's Absolute thus has something of the familiar "lion's den" character in its position with reference to the finite things; yet our author unquestionably means the relation of this consistent individual whole to the inconsistent finite appearances to be not as negative as was the relation of the jaws of the "glorified form" of Krishna to the heroes in the vision of the Bhâgavat-Gita. To the question, Does or does not the appearance lose itself, get so absorbed as to be utterly destroyed in the Absolute? Mr. Bradley replies again and again that nothing is lost. But beyond this point only metaphors, themselves somewhat Protean, as well as confusing, in their character, seem to be at our author's disposal for the definition of the true relations of the Absolute and its Appearances. The usual idealistic method of seeking in self-consciousness for the concrete and unmetaphorical instance of the true form of unity in variety has already been deliberately rejected by our author. The content of appearance "comes together harmoniously in the Absolute" (p. 239). "The content which the struggle has generated is brought home and laid to rest undiminished in the perfect" (p. 244). The Absolute is therefore "fully possessed of all hostile distinctions." "The main aspects of the world are all able to take a place within the Absolute" (p. 247). "The distinctions are reduced" "in the one great totality of absolute experience." And, p. 266: "They are lost there for our vision, but survive most assuredly in that which absorbs them."

Whatever this process is, it is, for the rest, entirely comprehensive. Even God, as religion must conceive him, is but an appearance (p. 448). He, too, must therefore be "laid to rest," as

would seem. The Absolute is not "merely personal" (p. 531). The categories of thought and of self-consciousness, as we saw before, are inadequate to express the nature of the one experience of which they too are but partial appearances. If, on the whole, however, the metaphors, despite these negations, so far still seem rather positive than negative, how about the following? In the whole, "the finites blend and are resolved" (p. 429). Lower ideals and finite appearances generally, are "transmuted" (pp. 430, 488). "If truth were complete, it would not be truth, because that is only appearance. . . . The theoretic object moves towards a consummation in which all distinction and all ideality must be suppressed" (p. 462). "All divergences" are "absorbed" in the outcome (*e.g.*, in the case mentioned, p. 467). The "discordance and distraction is overruled" (p. 488). Frequently, too, the positive and the negative metaphors are more or less immediately united in one expression. "Every finite diversity is also supplemented and transformed. Everything in the Absolute still is that which it is for itself. Its private character remains, and is but neutralized by complement and addition" (p. 510).

In the Absolute, then, in order to preserve the consistency of the whole, the finite blends, is preserved, is transmuted, is neutralized, is supplemented, is submerged, is laid to rest, is overruled, is absorbed, is undiminished, and is reduced, so that it is fully possessed, and is still that which it is for itself. Yet it is lost to our vision. Its distinctions are suppressed. It goes home and takes its place in the Absolute, to which it contributes and which owns it. There it gets a "rearrangement," an "all pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material," so that its things "lose their individual natures" (p. 529); and the result is "a compensated system of conspiring particulars" (p. 472). As the "conspiring particulars" have already been described as suppressed, transmuted, submerged and absorbed, one hardly sees what possible and still unused metaphor remains more fitting than to say perhaps that the finite gets whipped and put to bed in the Absolute, and one wonders not to find Mr. Bradley adding this to the rest.

Now the fault about a set of metaphors never lies in the mere fact that they are used, nor in the fact that they are many, nor that, if many, they fail, when set side by side, to give any one clear picture so long as they are merely regarded as images. It is often well to use metaphors, since they fix attention upon aspects of truth, well to vary them, lest they turn into fixed delusions, and well not to trouble

ourselves about their consistency, since our chance pictures are not likely to be mutually consistent. But what is not well is to offer nothing *but* metaphors when constructive conceptions are needed.

As a fact, then, to conclude our sketch with a few words of general criticism, Mr. Bradley's effort to conceive the unity of the finite in the Absolute is founded upon principles whose negative basis in Book I, the present critic in large part cordially accepts, while wishing, indeed, that Mr. Bradley had seen the way to supplementing his account of Self-Consciousness with a more positive theory. As to the positive principles at the basis of Book II, the present critic is also in pretty full sympathy. In fact, the whole first half of the book seemed to the present reader, despite all special matters of doubt, one of the most brilliant and powerful pieces of expert work in all recent metaphysical literature. On the other hand, the latter portion of the book gives an impression almost throughout of impatience with constructive detail, or else of unwillingness to risk definite formulations. The limitations of human insight we must all admit; the proper use of metaphors we must all admire; but a philosophy whose constructive formulas are apparently incapable of being translated by their author out of the metaphorical language in which he chooses to embody them, is, in the present condition of human reflection, unnecessarily near in its attitude to that reverence for the Unknowable which Mr. Bradley condemns in Mr. Spencer's thought. For Mr. Spencer's Unknowable is also a creature whose relations to us can be expressed only in metaphors.

But, it may be said, a confession of doubt or of ignorance is never unseemly in philosophy. One can see but what one has come to see. Yet Mr. Bradley, as a fact, is well acquainted with a vast literature of constructive metaphysical efforts on the part of men who have tried to define the Absolute on the general lines laid down in the early part of his own book. How "unity in variety," how an "individual system," "one whole of finite elements" in which "nothing is lost," is to be possible, — this problem has often been in general defined. And that the categories of thought in relation to its object, and of self-consciousness, have been employed to define just such an unity, nobody is better aware than Mr. Bradley. Now Mr. Bradley deliberately rejects the categories of the world of thought and self-consciousness, as being after all but finite, and as incapable of defining more than mere appearance. The present reader can only insist that, carefully as Mr. Bradley has indeed examined the categories of thought and object, the categories which

are more specifically those of self-consciousness have been treated by him with a curtness and an inadequacy wholly unworthy of his own skill and experience. The result is that he almost wholly abandons the only region where, despite our limitations, we finite beings have the least comprehensible indication, the least concrete and reasonably intelligible exemplification, of how one individual system *can* "bring home" and "suppress" and yet "keep" its own particulars. The consequence is—the metaphors aforesaid, and the almost pathetically inadequate conclusion of a magnificently begun and in part most admirably conducted enterprise, where learning, dialectical skill, depth, ingenuity, and delight in the spirit of free inquiry, have conspired to make many of the chapters almost classical in their excellence, while the whole book remains so fragmentary in its impression.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

On the Perception of Small Differences. By G. S. FULLERTON and J. M. CATTELL. Publications of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, 1892. — pp. 159.

The material for this treatise on the Perception of Small Differences was derived from a large number of experiments on the extent, time, and force of movement with the arm, on lifted weights and on lights. Under most of these divisions experiments were made according to four psychophysical methods, and commonly with several subjects,—the object being less to establish a 'law' than to investigate the mutual relations of the psychophysical methods, the value and meaning of variable and constant errors, the effects of practice, and "the significance of the confidence of the experimentee in relation to objective correctness."

As regards the psychophysical methods, the authors find the method of just observable difference unsatisfactory, the method of right and wrong cases the most accurate, and the method of average error the most convenient of all the methods. Merkel's method of doubled stimuli, and the method of mean gradations, classed together under the heading, "method of estimated amount of differences," give variable results, and the authors conclude that in these methods the "observer probably does not estimate quantitative relations in sensation, but quantitative differences in the stimuli learned by association" (p. 152). The experiments leave no doubt in regard to the faultiness of the method of j. o. d.; the results contradict each other and the results gained from other methods. At the same time,