

our waiters to "tip" them in this irregular fashion, let us say so, and, perhaps, some time move all together to end the custom. But let not the individual traveller try to convert to manhood the individual waiter, by insisting, against the custom of the place where he happens to find himself, upon his own "ideal social ethics," to the extent of refusing the expected "tip." If the mischief is ever shown to be considerable, let us meet it by organized devices, such as v. Ihering proposes. His plans, to be sure, are too elaborate for discussion here.

J. R.

NOTES ON CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

OUR contemporary, the *Monist*, a quarterly magazine published in Chicago, is working in the broad field of general science and philosophy after a fashion that cannot fail to be of very great service. The paths of the two quarterlies—the *Monist* and our own JOURNAL—are sufficiently separated for us easily to avoid actual concurrence, and still near enough together for us to feel constant co-operation. Worthy of every acknowledgment is the skill of the indefatigable editor, Dr. Paul Carus, in gathering so wide and representative a company of thinkers about his editorial table, to discuss together the problems of the day. In the April number, Professor Jos. LeConte discusses the burning question of the moment, the "Factors of Evolution," suggesting in somewhat characteristic fashion the direction in which, according to him, we should look for a reconciliation of the "Lamarckians," as they are now so often called, and their opponents. That the problem of Professor LeConte's paper is one of great moment for the future of practical ethics, he himself suggests, and the suggestion is one that readers of Mr. Ball's recent little monograph, entitled, "Are the Effects of Use and Disuse Inherited?" will readily appreciate. Only, perchance, Professor LeConte's optimistic reconciliation of the Lamarckians and their opponents is rather too confident a solution of the very grave practical issue that seems to be involved in the controversy raised by Galton and by Weissman, and further developed through Professor James's treatment of the mental aspects of the whole matter in his recent "Psychology." The contributions of Professor Lombroso to recent numbers of the *Monist* carry with them the authority of his name and the waywardness of his

brilliant powers. They consist, in the main, of "Illustrative Studies in Criminal Anthropology."

THE *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* contains, in the second number of Volume IV. for the present year, an interesting study of Thomas Carlyle, by Professor Wilhelm Dilthey, of Berlin. Dilthey expresses a gentle surprise that the English have felt so much "interest in the domestic affairs of Carlyle." Germans, he says, do not share this interest, and the fact that Mrs. Carlyle had to do so much domestic work, to her own dissatisfaction, "leaves us [Germans] altogether indifferent (*lässt uns vollkommen kalt*)." Dilthey's own interest in Carlyle is, first, to review his general relation to German literature; and, second, to sketch the development of his thought sufficiently to "determine his place in the movement of the transcendental philosophy in Europe." That this place was mainly one of an ethical character is obvious. Dilthey makes much of Carlyle's practical efficiency. "Carlyle started upon the path that modern England has pursued: appeal to the laborers,—an effort to come to honorable understanding and co-operation with them. His work upon Chartism did an extraordinary service to England." "He found in our own Transcendental Philosophy," continues Dilthey, "the means of giving a reflective form to the faith that was in him; and to this philosophy he gave a new and effective expression, whereby it was enabled to become a power in social conflicts. Hereby he comes to occupy a significant place in the context of those spiritual movements that grew out of the Transcendental Philosophy." At this moment, when Carlyle's historical significance is unjustly neglected among us, Dilthey's essay comes as a serviceable reminder.

THE fourth number of the sixth volume of Wundt's "*Philosophische Studien*" contains a paper, by Johannes Schubert, on "Adam Smith's Moral Philosophie." The first section of the paper discusses the "Evolution of Moral Philosophy, from Shaftesbury to Hume." The second section treats of Smith's own views; the third section is devoted to a brief summary

and estimate. The key-note of the paper, as is natural in a study appearing in Wundt's own laboratory journal, is the thought of Adam Smith's significance as psychological analyst of the moral consciousness. Smith's doctrine is a "Gefühlsmoral,"—a doctrine of the "moral sentiments" of the most "consistent" and yet "natural" sort ("Zwanglosester Art"). The few psychological inconsistencies that occur here and there are slight errors, which do not alter the general effect. Especially does Schubert praise the skill of Adam Smith's deduction of justice. In the frequent comparisons with Kant, Schubert, as psychological student, easily gives the preference to Smith, whose purpose it is, after modern fashion, "to bring all the facts of the region of experience that is in question into the most consistent organization possible." Nevertheless, Smith's theory has the defect of giving insufficient attention to the specific problems of the will. Taken, however, in its wholeness, Smith's theory makes upon us now "an incomparably better impression than it would have made some decades ago, when ethics, to use an expression of Schopenhauer's, was still slumbering on the pillow that Kant had placed under its head." Finally, as an apparently faithful disciple of Wundt, Schubert blames the "extreme individualism" of Smith, which was, to be sure, a characteristic of his century, and points out that the new psychological school of ethical students works in the lines that have led Wundt to his definition of the "Gesamtwillen," or Universal Will. We should be glad, indeed, if our mention of Schubert's excellent paper attracted any reader's attention afresh to the ever-suggestive "Moral Sentiments" of Smith, so much neglected nowadays,—so worthy of attention always.

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