

both a travel and a picture subject under the appreciative and artistic hand of Howard Pyle, and the relics of the Lake Dwellers are shown and commented upon in another illustrated paper. Mark Twain makes a humorous contribution by merely printing extracts, from an old medical guide, which do not need his grotesque remarks to appear in themselves monstrous jokes, though otherwise intended. There is a good proportion of verse, but none of it equal to the natural pathos and occasional grace of William Winter's lines upon "The Ship that Sailed."

—*Scribner's* opens with a new number of its African series, upon the Congo savages, in which a good deal of information is given about the tribes and the general characteristics of the Congo State by a competent hand, and the tales of the text are well supported by the physiognomy and surroundings of the natives, including a tree hung with relics of cannibalism. A biographical paper upon Ericsson is principally confined to the facts of the inventor's early life, his Swedish ancestry and bringing up, and a reminder of how much he accomplished. A second paper, however, which may bring the man's individuality nearer, is promised. Mr. Bishop gives a long and detailed account of the literary celebrities of Madrid, of whom he writes with many compliments, and he says a good word for the city itself, usually not highly praised by travellers. The accompanying portraits supply all that is lacking of personal description in the text. The archeological image recently brought from the bottom of a boring in Idaho is the subject of a brief paper; and Mr. Eugene Schuyler tells a pathetic story of a Minnesota emigrant who wandered to Servia and there hunted for his ancestor's treasure, with the assistance and charity of the Servian Prime Minister. He died without success, but there is some reason to think that the treasure was found. The kindness of the Prime Minister is one of the finest traits of this curious story. Mr. Mallock writes sympathetically on the subject of Hungarian castles, with a few prefatory pages of interest upon Palladian architecture. Mr. T. R. Sullivan contributes one of his highly finished short stories upon a romantic motive which belongs to a sort of literature that has passed away.

—The *Century* also brings us a distinctly literary article in a paper of reminiscences of Emerson by a college boy with whom he talked of literature and writing. The notes seem to have been carefully made, and the sentences have the Emersonian manner. The matter is necessarily old, but the picture of Emerson's friendliness with the collegian, his kind companionship and disposition to be helpful, is very happily drawn, and the article is a contribution to Emersoniana worth remarking. The opening paper upon Japan, by John La Farge, is a wonderfully effective rendering in words of artistic impressions of light and color and of the novelty of the Orient, very familiarly and accurately made, and will quicken interest in what is to come from the same pen. The writer has succeeded in the difficult task of giving the sense of enchantment which he felt, and he does it necessarily without effort. Joseph Jefferson deals with Forrest, of whom he speaks with much considerateness with respect to faults of temper, and he closes with an almost photographic glimpse of his first visit to Paris. The religious article is taken up with a discussion of St. Paul's position in freeing the new faith from its Judaizing influences. The Lincoln biography is brought to an end, and the war-paper is really upon Jeff Davis's capture, which is told from all the

evidence, and may be regarded as settled in its incidents beyond any further disturbance by the historian. The French Revolution furnishes matter for some striking illustrations. The Congo State is also written of by the U. S. Commissioner, but without the lively directness of the English explorer. The new Constitutions of Washington and Montana, and Greek terracottas, are other subjects, and there is besides a quantity of fiction sufficient for those who do and those who do not enjoy dialect.

—Prof. A. B. Hart contributes to the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* for January an interesting article on the rise of American cities. He points out that in the United States not a city has had its situation determined by considerations of defence, and that in fact most of them are practically defenceless, a striking testimonial to the peaceful character of our age. As to the generalization that "it is much less important for a city to have the length of a great river behind it than to have a good harbor before it," we think that it is of little value, owing to "plurality of causes." The character of the surrounding country and the construction of railroads must be taken into consideration. Nor can we assent to the implication that in manufacturing cities, small and great, the public revenue is more likely to be misapplied than in seaports. The returns of taxation do not support this view. The increase of cities having a population of 8,000 and over, from 1800 to 1880, has been from 6 to 286; the percentage of population rising from 3.9 to 22.5. These cities, which have nearly one-fourth of the population, have more than one-half of the foreign element. If the children of foreign parents are counted as foreigners, our large cities have now passed into foreign control. Very striking results appear from the comparison of the ages of Americans and foreigners in some of our cities. In Boston there were, in 1885, 275,000 American-born persons to 132,000 foreign-born. But of the natives 137,000 were minors, while of the foreigners only 12,000 were minors. In New York, of five persons above the age of thirty-five years whom we might meet in 1875, the chances were that four were born abroad. Both in Boston and New York the excess of the female population is due chiefly to the preponderance of foreign-born women. The large requirements of city households for domestic servants partly account for this. We should have been glad of data showing whether the population of our great cities would sustain itself independently of immigration; but it is perhaps impossible to determine this problem. We should be pleased to conclude with Prof. Hart that the government of the cities is likely to improve with experience and the education of the community; but unless this is to be taken as a mere abstract proposition, we fear that it might not be easy to establish it by induction, and we find nothing in this article to support it.

—We noted last March the very severe report of the Cambridge University examiners upon the work of the candidates for commercial certificates. They held it to be almost worthless, and passed only eight out of the forty-nine who were examined. Earlier in the previous year, in July, there had been ninety-seven candidates, of whom no more than seventeen passed. This year's report makes a better showing. In July sixty-six candidates presented themselves, of whom twenty-five obtained certificates. The falling off in the number of applicants was most likely due to the severity of last year's examination and report, but this seems to have been a salutary harshness, for the quality of the work of this year is much

improved. A distinct advance has been made in the writing of French and German. The French and German conversation also is improved, many of the candidates having gone abroad during their holidays to get a little practice in it. The examiners say: "The impression left by the examination is that the work, as a whole, was much sounder than last year, and that in some schools the subjects prescribed have been intelligently taught, with results which have a real educational, as well as practical, value."

—A brilliant discovery has been made; and where in the world but at the Peabody Normal College at Nashville, Tenn. ? The plan has been invented of intrusting the temperature and the ventilation of each class-room to a committee consisting of students who are particularly interested in that room. These students are instructed in the special method of heating and in the proper means of ventilation for that particular room; they are provided with thermometers, and they doubtless pass an examination as to the delicacy of their sense of smell. They are then made absolutely accountable for the room being always in proper condition. It is singular that so simple a device as this should not have suggested itself to the heads of other institutions: a janitor, even if he were a scientific man, cannot be expected to take a deep interest in the air of a room which he is not obliged to sit in. Future generations will doubtless lament the backwardness of our civilization, when, to take two instances where every place of public resort would do as well, the Peabody Concert Hall in Baltimore has absolutely no means for letting out the intense heat produced by its numerous gas-jets, and when the Johns Hopkins University, the very hot-bed of chemical and physiological learning, holds its public lectures in a room so unprovided with air that persons of any olfactory delicacy find it very difficult to sit them through.

SALTER'S ETHICAL RELIGION.

Ethical Religion. By William Mackintire Salter. Boston: Roberts Bros. 1889. 8vo, pp. 332.

THE devoted leader of the Society of Ethical Culture in Chicago has here collected a number of lectures which were, for the most part, delivered before members of that body. Curiously enough, a volume containing several of these same lectures, in a German translation, was brought out in 1885 in Leipzig, so that Mr. Salter has received a favorable and well-deserved attention abroad before publishing in his own tongue.

The book is, as one might expect from its origin, rather didactic than speculative, and the author disclaims in his preface any other than a practical purpose. Mr. Salter's theory of ethics is, indeed, not entirely kept in the background in the course of the book; nor is he silent as to his opinions upon a number of philosophical and theological problems of a very grave sort. But, on the whole, as he tells us, he writes, not for "scholars," but for "men and women who are in the midst of the stress of life." He hopes to "refresh or invigorate the moral life" of his reader, to stir in some one "a divine discontent with himself and the state of society about him," and meanwhile to "nourish the hope that there is but one outcome of the course and evolution of things, namely, the victory of the good." Such a book must, as far as possible, be received on its own basis, and must be judged as a work of the "literature of power" rather than as a theoretically ambitious treatise.

So regarded, Mr. Salter appears as a distinctly impressive and attractive personality, modest, courageous, simple-minded, generous, and earnest. As for his general doctrine, it is in sum this: Religion is at once "man's supreme interest," and the expression of "man's relation with what is ultimate and supreme in the world." But man's supreme interest is the reverence for the good, and morality is that which, "truly interpreted, does bring man into contact with the final nature of things." This latter proposition Mr. Salter defends by pointing out that, "whatever else I may doubt about, I cannot doubt the law of duty," a law which "is not made and cannot be changed by God or man," and which "belongs to the nature of things." Not only is the moral law, then, a supreme objective fact, but it could not conceivably be otherwise. To one who looks at the matter thus, "morality becomes religion. He alone does a genuinely moral act who does it because he must, because the nature of things bears down upon him to do it. For the crystal, religion would be to become a crystal; to own the pressure that would yield the perfect form. For man it can only be to be a man, to perform the human part of the human task."

This "nature of things" to which Mr. Salter thus appeals is, however, not to be found in the world of sense, as this world now is. Even science, "in the strict sense of the word, knows nothing of right and wrong." "To the pure understanding, virtue and vice do not exist." Facts might "seem as constant as day and night, and yet have no right to be." Nor is the ideal world of morality "another world alongside of the actual world," a Platonic world of eternal essences. Nor has the moral "nature of things" its true source of authority in the will of God. Mr. Salter more than once, in fact, protests against any theory which should say that the ideal is, here or elsewhere, as yet realized, for "that is an unsatisfactory view of life which leaves us nothing to do." Older forms of faith, too confident of the divine order, have in fact enervated men by assuring them that the right always wins. On the contrary, "justice is always falling in the world"; and while old religions say, "The ideal does rule," the new religion will say, "Let it rule." Even this true religion, like the morality of which it is the "blossoming out," nowhere exists at present (p. 23), but is to come. Its fundamental faith will be that "the note of authority seems to go along with a certain class of ideas," such as humanity and justice. In short, as to this whole relation of the authority of the moral law to the "nature of things," Mr. Salter nowhere speaks more clearly than when he says (p. 19), "The truest revelation, the truest voice of the nature of things, is not in what we see, but in our thoughts of what ought to be. Trust thy dreams, oh Reformer! thou comest never so nigh to the heart and spirit of things as in them."

Our author's "nature of things" is thus very frankly a paradoxical conception, involving a very baffling *esse in potentia* as the "supreme truth" behind our world of experience. In fact, Mr. Salter's moral law, notwithstanding the majesty of its claims, frequently reminds us of the *Homunculus* of Faust, and appears to be saying to humanity:

"Laest mich an eurer Seite gehn;
Mir selbst golltetet's zu entstehn."

But such potential realities have had, ever since Aristotle, an important place in speculation, and we make no question that the para-

doxes of our author's doctrine have a deep foundation in the nature of his topic.

In the further development of his ethics, Mr. Salter, despite his indifference to traditional theology, bears in many respects a strong resemblance to Bishop Butler. One is reminded of the 'Ethical Sermons' by many things in these lectures. In style, to be sure, Mr. Salter is remote enough from the slow-footed Bishop, and moves with the ease of a practised modern speaker, while in many respects his language shows the influence of Emerson. But the doctrine is often very similar to Butler's, save as to matters of theology proper. The appeal is always to the "true human conscience," which, as Mr. Salter explains in his fifth lecture, is independent in its judgments of the accidents of changing custom and opinion. Conscience, or, as Mr. Salter often prefers to call it, "the supreme thought to do what is right," counsels principles which are organizing in their nature, which are rationally supreme over the natural impulses of men's hearts, and which are still not self-executing, but need the coöperation of free agents. The supremacy of these principles is, therefore, as Butler would have said, "authority" as distinguished from "might." The principles are to be found by self-examination. No honest man can doubt them. No higher reason can be given for them than that we know them to be true (p. 70). At the same time, like Butler, our author is glad to appeal, for didactic purposes at least, to the facts of experience, in so far as they illustrate, and even sometimes seem to confirm, those moral truths which are all the while not "matters of fact" at all, but ideals. With a delight in the concrete world such as is very natural for one whose moral ideals must grow occasionally lonesome in their empty heavens, our author follows with satisfaction the partial triumph of morality which Darwinism has made plain as a tendency in human evolution. Very much in the same way, Butler, whose theology was full of somewhat disheartening problems, loved to confirm the divine authority of conscience by appeals to the facts of experience known in his day. And Mr. Salter once more reminds us of Butler in his whole bearing towards what is now called Hedonism in ethics.

We have, of course, no space to follow our author into further details. The lectures are practical discussions, whose chief value lies in the fine temperament that expresses itself in them. They touch upon many interesting modern problems, e. g., in the discussion of the "Rights of Labor"; although as to such matters they have possibly a tendency rather to ennoble than to enlighten Mr. Salter's audience—a criticism which we make in no captious spirit; for what else could be expected of a brief homily upon complex social problems? A still more delicate topic is treated in lectures x. and xi., on the "Ethics of Jesus," where Mr. Salter solves very well the problem of uniting plain speech and pronounced liberalism with a true seriousness of tone that ought to offend no opponent. Unitarianism is ingeniously criticised in lecture xiv., on the ground that while it is "benevolent, humane, philanthropic, as those words go," it still "does not call on us to create a new heaven and a new earth," "does not appeal to the infinite side of human nature," and is enthusiastic over such matters as "supporting old churches whose natural lives seem to be already spent." "Unitarians," says Mr. Salter, "manifest no great discontent with the world about them." These expressions show that Mr. Salter, with all his humanity and gentleness, is not incapable of making sharp speeches, and, accordingly,

they rather raise our respect for the charity with which he elsewhere is wont to treat all mankind.

After all, however, the unsatisfactory thing about these excellent lectures, even regarded from the practical point of view, is just the vagueness of the author's moral theory. Morality is rooted in the "nature of things," but not in "natural law," which as such is mere dead fact. The ideal does not "exist anywhere to-day," but is for all that a "truth supreme above all." We know this to be so partly because nothing but the good can survive in the long run. But mere survival, like any other fact known to science, has of itself no moral value, and the course of the world is often unjust. Morality rests upon an "ought" which a man can find only in his own heart. Some men, indeed, e. g., bad men and savages, find no such "ought," or else mistake its true character; but then such men do not count. Meanwhile, the "ought" is not merely in us. So we come back once more from what is in our hearts to that supreme "nature of things" which, nevertheless, we must not call by the name "God," except by way of conjecture or poetry, because to do so might be superstitious. Yet we must remember all the while that this supreme "nature" is nothing merely physical.

So many paradoxes together would form a more serious defect in such a work were they not, as every philosophical student knows, very deeply rooted in the nature of this most perplexing region of speculation. We call attention to them here (we repeat) for a reason as practical as Mr. Salter's own intentions. The Ethical Societies have doubtless their own mission to fulfil, and we hope that they may prosper in that mission. But if they address "men and women who are in the toil and stress of life," they also address for the most part intelligent and reflective persons who, for some reason or other, have abandoned traditional creeds. In such persons the leaders want to arouse moral enthusiasm. Would it not be well to arouse it by means of less obscure and vague accounts of what morality after all is? Noble sentiments and the "nature of things," and even the brute fact of the "survival of the fittest," may be good to appeal to in this lecture or in that; and doubtless this whole movement is more dependent on the personal power of the leaders than on any system of ideas; but is there not danger in these endless paradoxes and unexplained self-contradictions of one's teaching? Would not a systematic and even somewhat speculative theory of ethics be of use to the teacher, and that, too, even if he kept it in the background in his daily teachings? To be all things to all men is, indeed, the privilege of an apostle; but to appeal to anything and everything plausible except theology as a support to morality—is this enough? If one leaves behind what one takes to be superstitions in tradition, may not one end in making one's morality itself a superstition? And if the laymen of the Ethical Societies should chance to note such an outcome, what result could be more lamentable? We hope that Mr. Salter will soon develop the "philosophical views" of which he speaks in his preface.

THE AUSTRIAN STATE.

A History of Austro-Hungary, from the Earliest Time to the Year 1889. By Louis Leger. Translated from the French by Mrs. Birkbeck Hill, with a preface by Edward A. Freeman. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1889.

A LITTLE more than forty years ago, the cynical Metternich wrote in a despatch, "Italy is